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Abstract The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple real-
ization andmultiply realized kinds. Bechtel andMundale’s (Philos Sci 66(2):175–207,
1999) illuminating discussion of the subject must no doubt be credited with having
generated much of this renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses
what seems to be an important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep
a consistent grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims alleging the multiple
realization of psychological kinds are vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue
that, intuitions notwithstanding, the terms of their recommendationmake it impossible
to follow, while also misleadingly insinuating that its application virtually guarantees
mind-brain identity. Instead of a matching of grains, what multiple realization really
requires is a principled method for adjudicating upon differences between tokens.
Shapiro’s (J Philos 97(12):635–654, 2000) work on multiple realization can be under-
stood as an attempt to adumbrate just such a method. While his “causal relevance”
criterion can easily be mistaken for Bechtel and Mundale’s grain requirement, my
analysis reveals exactly where and why these two tests diverge.
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1 Introduction
The multiple realization (“MR”) hypothesis asserts, at its baldest, that the same psy-
chological state may be realized in neurologically distinct substrates (Polger 2009).
Hilary Putnam’s (1967) ingenious suggestion that pain is likely to be a multiply real-
ized kind (“MR kind”) rather neatly captures the thought—while presumably both
mammals and molluscs experience pain, they’re likely to instantiate it in neurological
systems of a very different sort. MR was played against a popular philosophical the-
ory of mind in the 1960s which attempted to identify mental states with neural states.
SinceMR implies a many-to-one mapping from neural states to mental states, if it is in
fact true that mental states are multiply realized, it follows that no clear identity rela-
tion can hold between them. As Bechtel and Mundale (1999, p. 176) frame the issue,
“[o]ne corollary of this rejection of the identity thesis is the contention that information
about the brain is of little or no relevance to understanding psychological processes”.
When the MR hypothesis first came to prominence, its critics by and large accepted
it as empirically correct, and merely denied its touted antireductionist implications.
In recent years the debate has struck a new note, with many philosophers calling the
empirical hypothesis itself into question. Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) influential
paper, followed quickly at the heels by Shapiro’s (2000) penetrating analysis of func-
tions, perhaps did most to reignite the old controversy and drag MR back into the
philosophical limelight. Bechtel and Mundale express what seems to be an important
insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across real-
ized and realizing kinds, claims alleging themultiple realization of psychological kinds
are vulnerable to refutation. In this paper I argue that, intuitions notwithstanding, the
terms of their recommendation make it impossible to follow, while also misleadingly
insinuating that its application virtually guarantees mind-brain identity. Instead of a
matching of grains, what MR really requires is a principled method for adjudicating
upon differences between tokens. Shapiro’s (2000) work on MR can be understood as
an attempt to adumbrate just such amethod.While his “causal relevance” criterion can
easily be mistaken for Bechtel and Mundale’s grain requirement, my analysis reveals
exactly where and why these two tests diverge.
2 Bechtel and Mundale’s grain requirement
Bechtel andMundale appeal to “neurobiological and cognitive neuroscience practice”
in the hope of showing how claims that psychological states are multiply realized are
unjustified. Essentially, theirs is an argument from success: cognitive neuroscience’s
method assumes MR is false, and the success of that method is evidence that MR is
false. They argue that it is “precisely on the basis of working assumptions about com-
monalities in brains across individuals and species that neurobiologists and cognitive
neuroscientists have discovered clues to the information processing being performed”
(1999, p. 177).
Bechtel and Mundale examine both the “neuroanatomical and neurophysiologi-
cal practice of carving up the brain”. What they believe this examination reveals is,
firstly, that the principle of psychological function plays an essential role in both dis-
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ciplines, and secondly, that “the cartographic project itself is frequently carried out
comparatively—across species” (1999, p. 177), the opposite of what one would expect
ifMRwere “a serious option”. It is the very similarity (or homology) of brain structures
which permits generalization across species; and similarity in the functional charac-
terization of homologous brain regions across species only makes sense if the claims
of MR are either false or greatly exaggerated. For instance, “[e]ven with the advent
of neuroimaging, permitting localization of processing areas in humans, research on
brain visual areas remains fundamentally dependent on monkey research…” (1999,
p. 195). “The clear assumption is that the neural organization in the macaque will
provide a defeasible guide to the human brain” (1999, p. 183). Brodmann’s famous
brain maps were based upon comparisons of altogether 55 species and 11 orders of
mammals. If MR were true, “one would not expect results based on comparative neu-
roanatomical and neurophysiological studies to be particularly useful in developing
functional accounts of human psychological processing” (1999, p. 178). They also
argue that the ubiquity of brain mapping as a way of decomposing cognitive func-
tion points to the implausibility of the MR thesis. The understanding of psychological
function is increasingly “being fostered by appeal to the brain and its organization”
(1999, p. 191), again, the opposite of what one would expect “[i]f the taxonomies of
brain states and psychological states were as independent of each other as the [MR]
argument suggests” (1999, pp. 190–91).
In light of such considerations, Bechtel and Mundale (1999, pp. 178–79, pp. 201–
204) resort to grains as a way of making sense of what they perceive to be the
entrenched, almost unquestioning consensus prevailing around MR. They think that
it can be traced to the practice of philosophers appealing to different grain sizes in
the taxonomies of psychological and brain states, “using a coarse grain in lumping
together psychological states and a fine grain in splitting brain states”. When Put-
nam went about collecting his various specimens of pain, he ignored the many likely
nuances between them. At the same time, he had few compunctions about declaring
them different at a neurological level. His contention that pain is likely to be an MR
kind can only command our respect if we can be sure that when he was comparing his
specimens from a neurological point of view he was careful to apply no less lenient
a standard of differentiation than he applied when comparing his specimens from a
psychological point of view. Bechtel and Mundale maintain that when “a common
grain size is insisted on, as it is in scientific practice, the plausibility of multiple real-
izability evaporates”. As their examples of neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
practice attest, scientists in these fields typically match a coarse-grained conception of
psychological states with an equally coarse-grained conception of brain states. Despite
the habit of philosophers individuating brain states in accordance with physical and
chemical criteria, a habit no doubt originating with Putnam, this is not how neurosci-
entists characterize them. The notion of a brain state is “a philosopher’s fiction” (1999,
p. 177) given that the notion neuroscientists actually employ is much less fine-grained,
namely “activity in the same brain part or conglomerate of parts”.
Anot unrelated factor is that theMRhypothesis often gets presented in a “contextual
vacuum”. The choice of grain is always determined by context, with “different contexts
for constructing taxonomies” resulting in “different grain sizes for both psychology
and neuroscience”. The development of evolutionary perspectives, for instance, in
123
3340 Synthese (2019) 196:3337–3353
which the researcher necessarily adopts a coarse grain, contrasts with the much finer
grain that will be appropriate when assessing differences among conspecifics:
One can adopt either a coarse or a fine grain, but as long as one uses a com-
parable grain on both the brain and mind side, the mapping between them will
be correspondingly systematic. For example, one can adopt a relatively coarse
grain, equating psychological states over different individuals or across species.
If one employs the same grain, though, one will equate activity in brain areas
across species, and one-to-one mapping is preserved (though perhaps further
taxonomic refinement and/or delineation may be required). Conversely, one can
adopt a very fine grain, and differentiate psychological states between individu-
als, or even in the same individual over time. If one similarly adopts a fine grain in
analyzing the brain, then one is likely to map the psychological differences onto
brain differences, and brain differences onto psychological differences (1999, p.
202).
There are various aspects of Bechtel and Mundale’s overall analysis that could
elicit a critical response. Various philosophers have supplied detailed criticisms of
them. Ken Aizawa (2009, pp. 500–503), for instance, detects a tacit claim in their
paper to the effect that unique cross-species localization of functions in the brain
entails their unique realization. This is thought to be a non sequitur. It is true that,
strictly speaking, what much of their paper succeeds in showing is the unlikelihood of
“multiple localization”, but two things can be said in response. Firstly, the criticism to
some extent misses the point of their analysis. Bechtel and Mundale have deliberately
opted for functional localization, i.e. brain activity in the same parts or conglomerate
of parts across species, as the relevant standard by which to judge the sameness or
difference of brain states, and they have done so in deference to cognitive neuroscience
practice. Localization is for them the appropriate standard to adopt because it is at
the right grain of description (see next section). Secondly, it is not actually easy to
police the distinction between localization and realization, for neural localization is
an important dimension of neural organization. Aizawa complains that Bechtel and
Mundale do not provide independent evidence in support of any such proposition, but,
all in all, it does not seem to be a particularly tendentious one.1 It is true that, for all
we know, functions could be localized in the same region in closely related species,
and yet be organized very differently. But surely we would need some reason to think
that this is likely.
Another criticism fastens upon the modality of the MR hypothesis. Bechtel and
Mundale shape their discussion of MR around the evidence favoring it among existing
biological systems, and hence construe the issue as an empirical one.Many proponents
of MR, however, take it to be a claim about metaphysical possibility. Thus a particular
version of the argument asserts that even ifMRdoes not hold among existing biological
systems, the possibility that cognitive states might be shared by built artifacts or alien
life forms having very different physical structures in itself establishes the salience of
theMR thesis. This version of the argument led somephilosophers ofAI to embrace the
1 It only appears to be tendentious when a certain paradigm of realization and MR, the so-called “dimen-
sioned” view, has one under its sway (see Gillett 2003).
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further metaphysical claim that “mental processes are the operations themselves, and
are not identified with whatever biological or other substances realize them” (Bechtel
and Mundale 1999, p. 176). Following Bechtel and Mundale’s lead, and the contours
of the recent debate surrounding MR, I shall not address this version of the argument
or the metaphysical claim which it inspired here. The possibility that artifacts could
have mental states is just the possibility that the identity theory is wrong, which is
precisely the claim in dispute (see Polger 2009, p. 459).
A more serious criticism of their argument is that it speaks only to species that
are homologous—it might demonstrate that the ubiquity of MR is questionable so
long as we restrict our gaze to primates and rodents (i.e. mammals generally, related
by common descent); but surely it does not succeed in showing that octopuses and
humans realize their psychologies in anything like the same way (Kim 2002; Shapiro
2008). This is a powerful criticism, and one to which no satisfactory response has yet
been given [although see Couch (2004), discussed below].
Stillwhat nophilosopher has so far called into question isBechtel andMundale’s use
of “grains”. On the contrary, it is often implicitly—and sometimes even explicitly—
endorsedby friend and foe alike (Couch2004; Polger 2009; P.Godfrey-Smith, personal
communication; C. Klein, personal communication; see also tacit approval in Aizawa
and Gillett 2009, p. 573). Polger (2009) explains the motivation for the grain require-
ment in an illuminating way. Neuroplasticity has in recent times been thought to
provide compelling evidence for the MR of mental states. He concludes that “contrary
to philosophical consensus, the identity theory does not blatantly fly in the face of
what is known about the correlations between psychological and neural processing”
(2009, p. 470). The grains argument figures prominently in his reasoning. As he points
out, it might be tempting to regard a phenomenon like cortical map plasticity—where
different brain regions subserve the same function at different times in an individual’s
history, say, after brain injury or trauma—as an existence proof of MR. But not if the
point about grains is taken to heart. It all comes down to what we mean by “different
brain regions” subserving “the same function”. Consider that recovered functions are
frequently suboptimal. Genuine MR would indeed require the same psychological
state to be underwritten by different neurological states; but suboptimality is evi-
dence of difference underlying difference, not difference underlying sameness, as MR
requires:
It’s true that this kind of representational plasticity involves the “same” function
beingmediated by “different” cortical areas. But here one faces the challenge lev-
eled by Bechtel andMundale’s charge that defenses of [MR] employ amismatch
in the granularity of psychological and neuroscientific kinds. If we individuate
psychological processes quite coarsely—by gross function, say—then we can
say that functions or psychological states are of the same kind through plastic
change over time. And if we individuate neuroscientific kinds quite finely—
by precise cortical location, or particular neurons—then we can say that cortical
map plasticity involves different neuronal kinds. But this is clearly amug’s game.
What we want to know is not whether there is some way or other of counting
mental states and brain states that can be used to distinguish them—no doubt
there are many. The question is whether the sciences of psychology and neuro-
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science give us any way of registering the two taxonomic systems (1999, p. 467,
my emphasis).
3 Problems with the grain requirement: imprecise, impracticable, and
misleading
But now the question is this: what, precisely, can it mean to use a “comparable”
grain, or to keep a grain size “constant”, across both psychological and neurophys-
iological taxonomies? Polger’s motivation makes a lot of sense, to be sure, but talk
of “registering” taxonomies (as of aligning classificatory regimes, or rendering dis-
tinct scientific descriptions commensurable, or however else one might care to put it)
doesn’t shed any light on how the desideratum for consistent grains can actually be
met. Since it is intended to serve in part as a methodological prescription, it’s impor-
tant to know what to make of this requirement—metaphors won’t help us here. How,
in concrete terms, is an investigator meant to satisfy such a condition as this on their
research?
Let me begin by using pain and hunger as the MR kinds in question, both because
they are states about which Bechtel and Mundale have something to say and because
they have long been staples of the MR literature. In Sect. 2 I mentioned that when
Putnamwent about collecting his various specimens of pain, he ignored themany likely
subtle differences between them—even as he had few scruples about declaring them
different at a neurological level. Bechtel and Mundale’s complaint against Putnam
therefore seems to be that when he says that pain (or hunger) is likely to be an MR
kind, we can only go along with him if we can be sure that, when he was comparing
his specimens from a neurological point of view, he was careful to apply no less
lenient a standard of differentiation than he applied when comparing his specimens
from a psychological point of view. But because in their view he didn’t do this, he
opened himself to their challenge that he was unduly permissive in his classification
of psychological states. This explains why Bechtel and Mundale chide that:
A human’s psychological state and that of an octopus might well be counted as
the same insofar as they are associated with some general feature (such as food-
seeking behavior, in the case of hunger). But with respect to other considerations,
a human psychological statemay be considered different from that of an octopus,
even if we limit the scope to mere behavior. Food-seeking behavior for the
octopus is different from food-seeking behavior in the human if one is concerned
about such things as how one seeks the food, what foods are sought, under what
conditions, etc. (1999, p. 203).
This seems intuitive and sensible. In the present context, therefore, the word “grain”
seems to mean something like, “the basis for comparison”, or more precisely, “the
respect under which we seek to compare a set of tokens”; and “same” grain means
something like “equally permissive or stringent (bases of comparison)”. I think this
takes us a step closer to what Bechtel and Mundale mean when they exhort us to
employ the same grain across realized and realizing kinds. MR requires a comparison
of a set of tokens from both a psychological and a neurological point of view; and we
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must see to it (somehow) that these cross-disciplinary reference points are on talking
terms. So far so good.
But now what does this mean? How can the bases for comparing a set of tokens
(in the present context, two brains) be “on talking terms” or “commensurable” or
“comparable” when the bases are delivered by two distinct disciplines (in the present
context, psychology and neuroscience)? I’m going to illustrate what I take to be the
most natural way in which such cross-disciplinary reference points can be brought into
alignment by using an example where the two disciplines aremore clearly distinct than
psychology and neuroscience. In this way the nature of the problem will be brought
into much sharper relief than if I were to stick with psychology and neuroscience.
Suppose you have two tokens of fruit. The science of botany (say) could deliver
descriptions under which the two are classified the same (e.g. from the point of view
of species), but also descriptions under which they come out different (e.g. from the
point of view of varieties). The first description could be said to apply a coarser grain
than the second. Now imagine economics coming into the picture. The science of
economics can likewise deliver descriptions under which both tokens are classified
the same (e.g. both are forms of tradable fresh produce) or different (e.g. one, being
typically the crunchier and sweeter variety, has a lower elasticity of demand than the
other). Once again, the first description could be said to apply a coarser grain than the
second. Perhaps, then, we could take it that botany and economics deliver descriptions
at the same grain of analysis when their judgments of sameness or difference cohere in
a given case. In the example, botanical descriptions via species classification would be
furnished at the same grain as economic descriptions via commodity classification, so
that species descriptions in botany are “at the same grain” as commodity descriptions
in economics. By the same logic, variety descriptions in botany would be comparable
to elasticity descriptions in economics.
This construal is fairly reasonable, I think, and it’s a serious, charitable attempt to
make sense of Bechtel and Mundale’s recommendation. Still, there’s a big problem
here. If this is all that “maintain a comparable grain” amounts to, it really does beg
the question, for this is simply type-type identity by fiat. Of course such a recommen-
dation will ensure that the mapping between psychology and neuroscience will be
“systematic” (to use Bechtel and Mundale’s term), because on this account yielding
concordant judgments of similarity or difference across taxonomies is simply what it
means to apply the same grain. So this version of the grain requirement makes type-
type identity a fait accompli, effectively obliterating all MR kinds from the natural
order.
It’s just as well that I don’t think this is quite what Bechtel and Mundale had in
mind when they made their move to grains. And yet they do say: “One can adopt either
a coarse or a fine grain, but as long as one uses a comparable grain on both the brain
and mind side, the mapping between them will be correspondingly systematic” (note
that—it will be!). This sounds like someone with the utmost confidence in the grain
requirement, which is of course what one would have if one thought grains could be
legitimatelymatched in just thisway. In the same passage they assert that, in the context
of a researcher invoking a relatively coarse grain to equate psychological states across
different individuals or species, “[i]f one employs the same grain…one will equate
activity in brain areas across species, and one-to-one mapping is preserved…” (my
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emphasis). “Onewill equate…”?How can they be so sure?My guess is that, while they
do have something important to tell us about MR, a beguiling metaphor has led them
to suppose that MR is easier to refute than it actually is (I’ll support this contention
with a few examples in a moment.).
If not by this means, then, how else might two taxonomic descriptions be rendered
commensurable? Perhaps when I suggested a moment ago that two sciences deliver
descriptions at the same grain of analysis when their judgments of sameness or differ-
ence cohere in a given case I should have added “likely (to cohere)”. We would then
have:
Any two sciences deliver descriptions at the same grain of analysis when their
judgments of sameness or difference are likely to cohere in a given case.
This would at least solve the problem of inevitability, and makes sense of Bechtel
and Mundale’s more cautious choice of words near the same passage I cited earlier,
where they say, in the context of a researcher invoking a fine grain to differentiate
psychological states, “[i]f one similarly adopts a fine grain in analyzing the brain,
then one is likely to map the psychological differences onto brain differences, and
brain differences onto psychological differences” (1999, p. 202, my emphasis). “Is
likely to” is better than “will”. Still, this more cautious formulation doesn’t immunize
them from the serious errors I point out below. It appears that the distinction between
likelihood and inevitability must be handled very carefully in this debate, as is shown
by Bechtel and Mundale’s following remarks on computer programs:
One often speaks of running the same program on different computer archi-
tectures, thereby generating a case of multiple realization. But in fact one has
surreptitiously adopted a coarse grain in characterizing the program. If one looks
carefully enough at performance measures, one will generally be able to iden-
tify differences in the way the program runs on different computers” (1999, pp.
202–203, my emphasis).
How carefully need we look before we can stop looking? Until the mapping is one-
to-one between software and hardware? What if we don’t find a one-to-one mapping,
having already looked more carefully at the software, but could have a one-to-one
mapping if only we look yet a little more carefully? Do we stop, or keep going? How
do we know? The road from a likely one-to-one mapping to an inevitable one-to-one
mapping is here at its most precarious.
But let’s try to remedy this if we can. Bechtel andMundale are obviously after some
feature of taxonomic description that can, as it were, latch onto a corresponding feature
of another taxonomic description. Perhaps this makesmost sense if we replace the idea
of a “grain” with the idea of a “level”, and more specifically a “level of description
or abstraction”. A software program may be described at different levels (machine
language, assembly language, compiler language, etc.), as indeed may its underlying
hardware (microphysical events, transistors, chips/circuits, etc.). This at once provides
a much clearer picture of howwemight go about scoring off levels from one discipline
against another (and thereby achieve that most elusive and sought-after match between
grains). Higher levels of software will correspond to higher levels of hardware—and it
need not be inevitable that two programs with the same compiler language will be the
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same at the circuit level, even though the compiler language occupies (let’s say) the
corresponding rank within the software hierarchy that the circuit level does within the
hardware one. Translating this thought into the present context, different psychological
levels must be understood as tallying up with different neurological levels. When the
levels of description correspond, the descriptions are at the “same grain”.
This does seem more promising, I agree, but I suspect that it is beset with more
problems in turn. For example, can we really lay out these two sciences (psychology
and neuroscience—indeed any two sciences!) on the Procrustean bed of “comparable
levels”? And more worryingly, who gets to say whether a level within the hierarchy
of one discipline really tallies with a level drawn from the hierarchy of another dis-
cipline? I fear that replacing “grains” talk with “levels” talk serves only to demystify
temporarily. The problem has been merely postponed.
Of course matters aren’t much helped by the reasonable suspicion that MR is the
result of pairing inconsistent grains. For what is neuroscience if not a fine-grained
description of psychology, and psychology if not a coarse-grained description of neu-
roscience? It is surely plausible that the neural and psychological sciences line up in
something like this way, given that talk about the mind is really talk about the brain
from a somewhat more abstract point of view.
What Bechtel andMundale are ultimately trying to convey through their discussion
of grains is the thought that claims of MR cannot be advanced willy-nilly—that there
is an objective and standard way to go about verifying the existence of MR kinds and
arbitrating disputes involving them. For the reasons just canvassed, however, it strikes
me that talk of grains doesn’t serve their purposes at all well. In fact they would have
been nearer the mark had they said that what MR requires is some sort of principled
mismatching of grains.
So far I’ve tried to indicate in what respects Bechtel and Mundale’s grain require-
ment is imprecise and impracticable. Before I can show that the grains strategy is also
misleading, and actually often gets things wrong, I need to set it against an account
which demonstrably gets things right, indeed an account which even its detractors
concede gets something very important right (e.g. see Gillett 2003, pp. 591, 592, 596,
597, 599, 600). Shapiro (2000) expresses with enviable lucidity what I think is the
crucial insight towards which Bechtel and Mundale were uneasily groping.2 Interest-
ingly, some philosophers—e.g. Polger (2009)—write as if the grain requirement and
Shapiro’s own formula for MR were effectively interchangeable. This is a mistake:
the two approaches deliver different judgments in nontrivial cases (as I’ll illustrate in
a moment).
2 Shapiro ultimately uses his analysis to draw out a dilemma confronting the MR advocate. If a given
functional kind is not multiply realized, the traditional argument for its autonomy and irreducibility falls
away. If on the other hand the kind is multiply realized, the kind will not be a proper scientific kind, i.e.
of the sort that can enter into laws. “Brittleness” might be a multiply realized property, but glass, steel and
biscuits are each brittle in their own way: there can be no general science of brittle things. Ranging over
such genuinely diverse physical realizations means the kind will not enter into laws (i.e. exhibit lawlike or
projectable properties), except for those which are true analytically—such as all mousetraps catch mice,
and all eyes see—and this in turn “undercut[s] the traditional motivation for admitting functional kinds into
the ontologies of the special sciences” (Shapiro 2000, p. 637). In this paper I will not be addressing this
issue, but see Couch (2009a, pp. 262–264) for some criticisms. In more recent work Shapiro himself seems
to have backed away from this position (Polger and Shapiro 2016).
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As Shapiro reminds us:
Before it is possible to evaluate the force of [theMR thesis] in arguments against
reductionism,wemust be in a position to saywith assurancewhat the satisfaction
conditions for [the MR thesis] actually are (2000, p. 636).
For him, “[t]he general lesson is this. Showing that a kind is multiply realizable, or that
two realizations of a kind are in fact distinct, requires some work” (2000, p. 645). Fur-
thermore, “[t]o establish [the MR thesis], one must show that the differences among
purported realizations are causally relevant differences” (2000, p. 646). Shapiro’s con-
cerns revolve aroundwhatmotivates ascriptions of difference, and therefore sameness.
The issue is important because the classic intuition pump that asks us to conceive a
mind in which every neuron has been replaced by a silicon chip depends on our
ascription of an interesting difference between neurons and silicon chips, apparently
even where silicon chips can be made that contribute to psychological capacity by
one and the same process of electrical transmission. His answer too, like Bechtel and
Mundale’s, depends ultimately on context—in particular, the context set by the very
inquiry into MR itself.
Shapiro (2000, pp. 643–644) argues that “the things for which [the MR thesis] has
a chance of being true” are all “defined by reference to their purpose or capacity or
contribution to some end”. This is the reason why carburetors, mousetraps, computers
and minds are standard fare in the literature of MR. They are defined “in virtue of
what they do”, unlike, say, water, which is typically defined by what it is, i.e. its
constitution or molecular structure, and accordingly not an MR kind. Genuine MR
requires that there be “different ways to bring about the function that defines the
kind”. Truly distinct (indeed multiple) realizations are those that “differ in causally
relevant properties—in properties that make a difference to how [the realizations]
contribute to the capacity under investigation”. Two corkscrews differing only in color
are not distinct realizations of a corkscrew, because color “makes no difference to their
performance as a corkscrew”. Similarly, the difference between steel and aluminium
is not enough to make two corkscrews that are alike in all other respects two different
realizations of a corkscrew “because, relative to the properties that make them suitable
for removing corks, they are identical”. In this instance, differences of composition
can be “screened off”. Naturally there may be cases where differences of composition
will be causally relevant (and it turns out that this will be important to the broader
point I make below about where the grains strategy goes wrong). Perhaps rigidity is the
allegedlyMRkind in question. In that event, compositional differenceswill necessarily
speak to how aluminium and steel achieve this disposition. The crucial thing to note
here is that in a nontrivial senseMR is the context, because the very inquirywhich seeks
to determine whether a kind is multiply realizable itself imposes an implicit contextual
constraint:MRmakes function the primary comparative consideration (i.e. the specific
point of view from which we will compare a set of tokens in the first instance)—not
phenomenology, not behavioral ecology, or anything else for that matter. MR is after
all a thesis about sameness and difference (Polger 2009); and any two particulars will
both differ and resemble infinitely (Bechtel and Mundale 1999, p. 203). Whether two
particulars are “the same” or “different” therefore depends on the aspect from which
we choose to compare them. It just so happens that to ask whether a kind is an MR
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Fig. 1 A waiter’s corkscrew (a) and a winged corkscrew (b). Each contributes to the capacity of cork-
removal in different ways
kind is already to have decided this preliminary question: what we want to know
here is whether two tokens that serve a particular function do so in the same way.
Explanatory considerations may of course fine-tune the sort of function that captures
our attention (cork-removal, rigidity, vision, camera vision, etc.). But function here is
our key preoccupation, and having settled on a specific function which a set of tokens
can be said to perform, the all-important question on Shapiro’s analysis is how the
two tokens bring that function about. Each case must be judged on its own merits.
Thus unlike the two corkscrews identical in all respects save color, which do not count
as distinct realizations, waiter’s corkscrews and winged corkscrews are enabled to
perform the same task in virtue of different causally relevant properties, and therefore
do count as genuinely distinct realizations of a corkscrew, one based on the principle
of simple leverage, the other relying on a rack and pinions (Fig. 1).
Notice that to the extent Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion envisages certain real-
izing properties being “screened off” from consideration in the course of inquiry, there
is a sense in which the taxonomies of realized and realizing kinds may be said to be
“commensurable” or “registrable” (no doubt explaining why some philosophers have
simply confused commensurability with causal relevance). Thus when comparing the
cork-removing properties of two waiter’s corkscrews, compositional differences will
not feature in the realizing taxonomy (if we accept Shapiro’s characterization of the
problem). Sowe have cork-removal, which features inwhat wemay regard as a coarse-
grained taxonomy, realized by two objects described by a “science” of cork-removal
in which microstructural variations do not matter, hence which might also be regarded
as a coarse-grained taxonomy. If on the other hand we were comparing the same
corkscrews for rigidity, where one was made of steel and the other of aluminium,
compositional differences would feature in the realizing taxonomy. Here we would
have rigidity, which features in what we could well regard as a more fine-grained tax-
onomy than that encompassing cork-removal, realized by two objects described by a
science in which microstructural variations really domatter (namely metallurgy), and
which might also be regarded as a fine-grained taxonomy, at least more fine-grained
than the fictitious science of cork-removal. But my point is this: commensurability
nowhere appears as an independent criterion of validity in Shapiro’s account of MR,
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for it is an artifact of the causal relevance criterion, not a self-standing principle. Tax-
onomic commensurability is in fact an implicit requirement of the causal relevance
criterion in the sense that it’s taken care of once the proper question is posed. As an
explicit constraint it is a will-o’-the-wisp.
Armed with this analysis, let’s examine how Bechtel andMundale attempt to refute
the status of hunger as an MR kind. Putnam (1967) had compared hunger across
species as diverse as humans and octopuses to illustrate the likelihood that some
psychological predicates are multiply realizable. On the basis of their grains critique,
however, Bechtel and Mundale suggest that hunger will not do the work Putnam had
cut out for it; for “at anything less than a very abstract level”, hunger is different in
octopuses and humans (1999, p. 202). The thought is that a finer individuation of
hunger refutes the existence of a single psychological kind, hunger, which can be said
to cross-classify humans and octopuses. Thus they essay to challenge the cognitive
uniformity which MR requires at the level of psychology.
Perhaps we might first note that when identifying a single psychological state to
establish the necessary conditions for MR, nothing Bechtel and Mundale say actually
precludes the choice to go abstract. If context is what fixes the choice of grain (as they
are surely right to point out), who’s to say that context couldn’t fix the sort of grain
that makes hunger relevant in an abstract sense? It may be tempting to think that a
more detailed description of something is somehow more real. But there is of course
nothing intrinsically more or less real about a chosen schema relative to others that
might have been chosen (there is no reason to suspect, for instance, that a determinate
has any more reality than a determinable). This consideration applies with no less
force when we decide to let the sciences dictate what the relevant kinds will be, since
different sciences can take both more and less abstract objects within the ken of their
inquiries (Craver 2007). In fact one way of reading Bechtel and Mundale’s paper
(particularly Sects. 2–4) is precisely as suggesting that kind individuation should be
fixed by the sciences. This point comes through pretty clearly when they discuss the
individuation of neural states. In that specific context their paper provides excellent
and detailed examples of how scientific taxonomies can be invoked in debates over
MR. The philosophical notion of a brain state, they complain, is a “philosopher’s
fiction”, because brain scientists by and large do not individuate brain states on the
basis of physical and chemical criteria; it is enough for their purposes to employ the
much coarser notion of “activity in the same brain part or conglomerate of parts”. This
is a clear demonstration of how regard for the sciences may frequently mean opting
for less precise/more abstract descriptions of phenomena.3
Notice, incidentally, that when it comes to the individuation of psychological states
(as distinct from neural states), Bechtel and Mundale’s advice about heeding the
sciences seems to get lost. The part of their paperwhere they domost to explicate a fine-
graining procedure for psychological kinds (1999, pp. 201–204) nowhere exemplifies
how the cognitive sciences can be invoked to guide individuation of psychological
3 Bechtel andMundale’s test at this point can be seen as a bowdlerized version of Shapiro’s causal relevance
criterion, which screens off causally irrelevant details when comparing realizing kinds (much as Bechtel
and Mundale’s “coarse-graining” procedure does).
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kinds.4 Instead they rely on “kind splitting” (Polger and Shapiro 2016), where a given
(higher level) kind (e.g. vision, as instanced in both humans andmolluscs) is described
in increasingly greater detail until the illusion that two tokens are the same is finally
dispelled (allegedly demonstrating, for example, that human eyes and mollusc eyes
are in fact different psychological kinds, not instances of the same overarching psy-
chological kind “eye”). But kind splitting is gratuitous if it ignores the explanatory
salience of the higher level kind (see below), and in none of their examples (see 1999,
pp. 201–204) are the cognitive sciences actually consulted to check for this salience.
This is precisely the point at which the cognitive sciences would be most instructive:
we need to be sure whether a split is justified, and thus whether a split would really
undermine the integrity of a given higher level kind. So at least in the context of indi-
viduating psychological kinds, it would appear that Bechtel and Mundale have failed
to heed their own advice.
And yet there is a deeper problem with Bechtel and Mundale’s deployment of the
grains strategy here. To repeat their complaint: “at anything less than a very abstract
level”, hunger is different in octopuses and humans. But now why should this be
relevant? Who would deny it? They themselves seem to be oblivious to the context
which the very inquiry into MRmakes paramount. They are not right to allege, as they
do, that “the assertion that what we broadly call ‘hunger’ is the same psychological
state when instanced in humans and octopi has apparently been widely and easily
accepted without specifying the context for judging sameness” (1999, p. 203). The
reason why hunger, pain, vision and so on were all taken for granted—assumed to be
uniform at the cognitive level—is because MR made function the point of view from
which tokens were to be compared. As Shapiro reminds us, “the things for which [the
MR thesis] has a chance of being true” are all “defined by reference to their purpose or
capacity or contribution to some end”. It was understood that, say in the case of pain,
regardless of phenomenal, ecological or behavioral differences between human and
octopus pain (I doubt any of which were lost on Putnam), all instances of pain in these
creatures had something like detection and avoidance in common. This might be to
cast pain at “a very abstract level”, but this just happens to be the context which the
inquiry into MR itself sets. A similarly abstract feature is what unites all instances of
hunger: let’s call itnutrition-induction. It is not that decades of philosophers had simply
forgotten to specify the point of view from which these psychological predicates were
being considered: it is rather that they simply didn’t need to, since all of them had
read enough of Putnam and the early functionalists to know what they were about.
Phenomenal and other differences that one might care to enumerate between these
predicates come a dime a dozen. But the whole point of functionalism was to abjure
the inquiry into essences and focus instead on the causal role of a mental state within
the life of an organism. Yes, this is to compare tokens from an “abstract level”, but
that’s what made functionalism intriguing to begin with. And if Shapiro’s analysis
is any guide, it is really the next step in the endeavor to verify the existence of an
MR kind that is the crucial one. Genuine MR requires that there be “different ways to
4 The nearest they come is this: “When comparing psychological states across different individuals,
psychologists…tend to ignore differences and focus on commonalities” (1999, p. 202). If anything, however,
one would have thought that this fact should actually discourage kind splitting (see text).
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bring about the function that defines the kind”. So the follow-up question concerns how
the relevant organisms achieve their detection and avoidance function, or nutrition-
induction function, or whatever the case may be. It is in fact only by asking this
next question that we can appreciate just how badly the grains strategy fares. The
attempt to individuate hunger more finely would not refute the multiple realizability
of hunger as between humans and octopuses if it could ultimately be shown that
humans and octopuses achieve their nutrition-induction capacities in different ways
(which seems extremely likely); for then the functional role of hunger would be played
by two different realizers—the issue to which the MR inquiry is directed after all—
notwithstanding that the functional role can be more finely described within a more
specific frame of reference. Similarly, the attempt to individuate pain more finely
would not refute the multiple realizability of pain as between humans and octopuses
if it could ultimately be shown that humans and octopuses achieve their detection and
avoidance capacities in different ways (which again seems extremely likely). The sort
of type reduction that cuts its teeth by fine-graining psychological categories (i.e. kind
splitting) is almost always trivially possible, since at the limit everything is a special
case; but the move won’t succeed in refuting the existence of an MR kind at a higher
level if the higher level functional kind can be brought about in causally distinct ways.
Of course there are occasions when kind splitting may be mandated by the sciences,
because the higher level kind has no taxonomic relevance. This makes sense if kind
individuation should be fixed by the sciences (Couch 2009a, b). In such cases the split
really would undermine MR at the higher level. But it’s important to emphasize that
these cases require careful consideration and may turn out to be rare in any event (see
Polger and Shapiro 2016, pp. 103, 104–105, 110–111; Couch 2009a, p. 267; 2009b,
p. 514).
So we see that the grains strategy, to the extent that it involves fine-graining psy-
chological states in order to undermine the cognitive uniformity required by MR, sets
itself a very easy job indeed, and mischaracterizes the nature of MR by its neglect
of function. Moreover Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion—which honors the core
concerns motivating Bechtel and Mundale’s resort to grains—does not demonstrate
that hunger (or pain) is type-reducible.
A good illustration of the grains strategy in action is provided by Couch’s (2004)
attempt to refute the claim that the human eye and the octopus eye are distinct real-
izations of the kind eye. Conceding differences at a neurobiological level, the strategy
again involves challenging the alleged uniformity at the cognitive level. As he explains,
“[e]stablishing [MR] requires showing that…the physical state types in question are
distinct [and] that the relevant functional properties are type identical. Claims about
[MR] can be challenged at either step” (2004, p. 202). Reminding us that psychologi-
cal states “are often only superficially similar”, and that “at a detailed level the neural
differences make for functional differences” (2004, p. 203), he states:
Psychologists sometimes talk about humans and species like octopi sharing the
same psychological states. However, they also recognize that there are impor-
tant differences involved depending on how finely one identifies the relevant
features...Establishing multiple realization requires showing that the same psy-
chological state has diverse realizations. But we can always disagree with the
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functional taxonomy, and claim there are psychological differences at another
level of description (2004, p. 203).
Thus he relates that while the two types of eyes have similar structure in certain
respects, both consisting of a spherical shell, lens and retina, they use different kinds
of visual pigments in their photoreceptors, aswell as having different numbers of them,
the octopus having one in contrast to the human eye which has four. They also have
different retinas. The human retina,with its rods and cones, allows the eye to focus light
by bending the lens, thereby changing its shape. The octopus eye, with rhabdomeres
instead of rods and cones, focuses light by moving the lens backwards and forwards
within the shell. All these factors show up as differences in output, not just structure.
The octopus, having only a single pigment, is colorblind, while its receptor’s unique
structure allows it to perceive the plane of polarized light. Retinal differences likewise
make for functional differences, with very little information processing occurring on
the octopus’s retina, unlike the case of the human retina. This produces differences in
stimuli and reaction times. So the two eyes might be similar, but when described with
a suitably fine grain, he contends, they come out type distinct. In the result they are
both physically and cognitively diverse, and so not genuine examples of MR.
Notice again that, contrary to what is claimed, it has not been demonstrated that
type-type identity prevails here after all (on the understanding that the kind camera
eyehuman reduces to its distinct neural type, and the kind camera eyemollusc in turn
reduces to its distinct neural type). If anything what this foray into mollusc visual
physiology succeeds in showing is that, relative to the kind camera eye, human camera
eyes and octopus camera eyes count as distinct realizations(!), for, assuming Shapiro’s
causal relevance criterion applies, human camera eyes achieve the function of camera
vision differently to the way octopus camera eyes achieve this function. Were we
to attend to the original inquiry, which concerned whether human eyes and octopus
eyes count as distinct realizations of the kind eye, Shapiro’s own response, for what
it’s worth, is clear (2000, pp. 645–646): here we do seem to confront a genuine case
of type-type identity, as Putnam himself assumed, because, relative to the function
of vision (not camera vision), both humans and molluscs achieve the function the
same way (namely, by camera vision!). Differences that would be relevant at the
neural level between humans andmolluscswhen asking how camera vision is achieved
can be conveniently screened off when the question is how vision, as distinct from
camera vision, is achieved. Again if pain or hunger were the kind in question, it seems
more likely than not that we would confront a case of MR (unlike with vision), as
we conjectured earlier. Explanatory context dictates the function of interest, and the
function is one that we have to assume is common to the tokens in question in order
to get the inquiry into MR off the ground. Indeed if Shapiro’s analysis is correct, with
MR we’re always asking how some common function is achieved by different tokens
that do that thing. Where there is no common function the question of MR cannot so
much as arise. The fact that the question does arise in all the cases we’ve considered is
a powerful indication that we’re dealing with functions which all the relevant tokens
actually share. The grains strategy confuses matters by suggesting that in many cases
involving putative MR kinds, psychological states can be individuated using a finer
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grain of description. But if what I have been saying is right, this is not the proper way
to refute a putative case of MR.
That mine is the correct assessment of the situation is not only attested to by
Shapiro’s analysis of MR, but also by the fact that it avoids the very mug’s game
Polger sought to eschew by embracing the grains strategy in the first place. If for any
putative MR kind I am free to cavil with the choice of your size of grain (“oh, that’s far
too coarse for psychology”, or “now that’s really not coarse enough for neuroscience”),
how is the resulting game any less of a mug’s game than the one we were trapped in at
the start? I myself have played a few of these games with philosophers. No one wins.
Couch’s remarks are telling: “we can always disagree with the functional taxonomy,
and claim there are psychological differences at another level of description”. So the
game goes on.5 Yes, it is true that Bechtel andMundale don’t overtly admit to thinking
their criterion eradicates MR kinds completely; and yet it would have been interesting
to see them pointing out even a single instance of anMR kind they think rightly counts
as such. But alas they don’t.6 All their examples come out as type-type identities after
being subjected to their test—even where it is highly likely that Shapiro’s more precise
test would lead us to conclude otherwise.
4 Conclusion
In sum, I think there’s a real problemwith the grain requirement. The central difficulty
is that in the terms in which it’s been put it is largely unworkable, and at best no
more than a loose metaphor. For a recommendation intended to serve at least in part
as a methodological reform, this is clearly unsatisfactory. I don’t deny that Bechtel
and Mundale were onto something. But whatever value their insight into MR might
have has been obscured by their unfortunate formulation of the issue. Moreover, as
I have tried to show, the formulation is unfortunate not just because it happens to be
unworkable. More worryingly, the argument from grains distorts the truth about MR
by encouraging the view that mind-brain identity comes for free once we invoke the
“same grain” of description across both realized and realizing kinds. But when the
insight to which this locution seems to point is expressed in terms that are intelligible
and empirically tractable (namely, Shapiro’s causal relevance criterion), mind-brain
identity seems anything but a fait accompli. Grains talk makes it tempting to think
MR is easier to refute than it in fact is. It is certainly true, as Bechtel and Mundale
acknowledge, that context fixes the choice of grain (where by “grain” we mean the
respect under which we seek to compare a set of tokens); but we are not ipso facto
obliged to employ a consistent grain across realized and realizing kinds (since this is
just about meaningless as far as a researcher into these matters would be concerned
and raises a host of difficulties beside). Rather than matching grains, what MR really
5 In subsequent work, Couch (2009a, b) has beenmore careful in his remarks, and has brought out explicitly
the importance of scientific taxonomy in the individuation of both neural and psychological kinds. Still I
notice that in these papers he doesn’t rely on granularity arguments, and indeed is even mildly critical of
them (2009b, p. 267). When grains hold sway, MR stands little chance of receiving a fair hearing.
6 By contrast, Couch (2009b, p. 514) puts forward human eyes and pigeon eyes as plausible candidates for
MR, and comments: “Accepting that this example is plausible is a revision from an earlier view of mine”.
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behooves us to do is to apply a principled method for adjudicating upon differences
between tokens of a functional kind. Shapiro’s work onMR shows us how to approach
this important task.
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